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Thus Spoke…The Gentlemen

The Gentlemen ransomware‑as‑a‑service ( **RaaS**) operation is a relatively new group that emerged around mid‑2025. Its operators advertise the service across multiple underground forums, promoting their ransomware platform and inviting penetration testers and other technically skilled actors to join as affiliates. In 2026, based on victims listed on the data […]

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MAIL token drain via Moolah flash-loan callback reentrancy

On May 13, 2026 at 23:22:02 UTC (BNB Chain block `98134017`), attacker EOA `0xcb26b3a469c5aee911d059a25de2b26ed52826e9` executed transaction `0x2fdd6aef515fb06ce803c55086bb71de712631979809c135cf6d02be133f5cdb`, which deployed bootstrap contract `0x8aa9cb61885121448f1bf9a5df80ec36c6fbd535` and executor `0xe812f2e6cdffdfa4ca496db0716a53301c37b705`. The attacker used Moolah proxy `0x8f73b65b4caaf64fba2af91cc5d4a2a1318e5d8c` as an unsafe flash-loan callback entrypoint, then composed nested flash loans, a large USDT borrow, and a deep Pancake/Vault […]

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BoostHook Leveraged Long Drain via Spot-Priced `openLong()` and Capped Same-Block Liquidations

BoostHook on Ethereum was exploited on 2026-05-13 in transaction `0xb45cc4d9c13c2c24b4bbf71db9e6f52ed24d174ad23ed2622a290289cebd3811` at block `25080848`. The attacker used a 120 WETH Morpho flash loan to push the ETH/PERP Uniswap v4 pool price upward, opened nine leveraged long positions through `BoostHook.openLong()` while the pool was temporarily overpriced, then reversed the price move and […]

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Huma Finance V1 Deprecated Pools Requested-to-GoodStanding Credit Lifecycle Drain

On May 11, 2026 at 14:19:25 UTC, three deprecated Huma Finance V1 `BaseCreditPool` proxy deployments on Polygon were drained by an attacker-controlled borrower contract. The exploit was a credit-lifecycle logic error with an access-control component: an open `requestCredit(…, preApproved=false)` path created `Requested` credit records, then an unrestricted `refreshAccount(address)` call advanced […]

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INK Finance Treasury Drain via Address-Only Payroll Claimer Authorization

INK Finance’s Workspace Treasury on Polygon was exploited on 2026-05-11 at block 86711192. The attacker used an address-control / authorization design flaw in the workspace payroll claim path: a freshly deployed CREATE2 contract at `0xd7c643517f98f58d3f9ba91de05d4f62620cfd10` was accepted as an eligible claim actor and triggered the treasury’s authorized transfer path. The […]

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Renegade Dark Pool Proxy Unprotected Initializer Delegatecall Drain

On May 10, 2026 at 08:27:23 UTC, Renegade Dark Pool Proxy 1 on Arbitrum ( `0x30bd8eab29181f790d7e495786d4b96d7afdc518`) was drained through an access-control failure in its initialization path. The attacker EOA `0x777253f28adc29645152b7b41be5c772a9657777` created an orchestrator contract, deployed malicious delegatecall logic, then called the proxy’s `initialize(…)` function with attacker-controlled addresses. The trace proves […]

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TrustedVolumes RFQ Proxy Drain

On Ethereum at 2026-05-07 00:47:35 UTC, the attacker exploited an authorization design flaw in TrustedVolumes’ custom RFQ flow to create a maker/signer relationship they controlled and then settle orders against a third-party resolver’s pre-approved balances. The loss in this transaction was approximately $5.87M, consisting of `1291.16110521587917927` WETH, `206282.446876` USDT, `16.93910519` […]

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